

DRAFT

30 March 1977

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of 26 January 1977 concerning Central Intelligence Agency policies with respect to the operations of "friendly" foreign intelligence services in the United States. As Mr. Knoche made clear in his communication to you of 21 January, the CIA has never had agreements with foreign intelligence services which would preclude the investigation of their activities in the United States. No CIA agreements authorized - either explicitly or implicitly - the conduct of unilateral clandestine activities in the U.S. by foreign intelligence services.

With regard to the request for copies of materials which reflect policies and procedures of the CIA with respect to "friendly" foreign intelligence service operations in the United States, our regulations do not address themselves directly to your question for two reasons: The responsibility for the investigation of the operations of foreign intelligence services in the United States rests with the FBI and, secondly, we basically make no distinction between "friendly" and other non-hostile services. Mr. Knoche's letter to you of 21 January transmits a memorandum which outlines our knowledge of these services in the United States and our philosophy in dealing with them.


The Agency's responsibility for the conduct of liaison with foreign intelligence services derives from National Security Council Directive No. 5.

The attached regulations, including those now rescinded but which were in effect between 1970-75, implement this basic directive by providing, among other things, that

25X

X1 relations in this country with liaison services are maintained at a minimum level sufficient to permit us to accomplish our collection and counter-intelligence responsibilities abroad. These regulations also embody our continuing policy against written or oral agreements with foreign services which would limit our freedom of action, such as the designation of spheres of influence or division of areas of responsibility. It is also our policy to avoid any commitments that might prove embarrassing or may become contrary to U.S. interests in the event of a political change or military upheaval. Additionally, we report to the FBI any manifestation of foreign intelligence activities, "friendly" or otherwise, in the United States which might come to our attention.

25X



25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001100060020-4

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001100060020-4

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Tony Lapham/OG

Tony -

Attached is the draft letter to Inouye as edited by you. Please let me know as soon as you have cleared it with Justice. In answer to your inquiry, I am trying to find out what State has done.

A/DDCI

Date 30 March 1977

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

25X1

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DDO

25X1

Here is the latest draft letter to Inouye

25X1

Tony is attempting to clear it with Justice. He inquired what action State has taken in response to the letter it received from the SSCI.

Do you know?

A/DDCI

Date 30 March 1977

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001100060020-4

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001100060020-4